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Abstract
This paper explores the optimal role of the tax system in alleviat-
ing labour-market imperfections, raising revenue, and correcting the in-
come distribution. For this purpose, the standard search model of the
labour market is extended by introducing non-linear vacancy costs due
to scarce entrepreneurial talent and by allowing for arbitrage between
being a worker and being an entrepreneur. We study how these exten-
sions a®ect the following three major implications of the standard model:
(1) only the ad valorum component of the wage tax should be employed
to raise revenue; (2) the optimal tax system should not distort labour-
market tightness; (3) the tax system cannot redistribute from workers to
entrepreneurs.
1 Introduction
The traditional incidence and welfare analysis of taxation assumes perfect mar-
kets. This holds true also for the analysis of taxes on labour income, even
though the labour market tends to feature several imperfections giving rise to
involuntary unemployment. In recent years, however, widespread unemploy-
ment in Europe has lead various researchers to reconsider the implications of
taxes on labour income within the context of imperfect labour markets (see
S¿rensen (1997) and van der Ploeg (1998)). Lockwood and Manning (1993),
Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994), Holmlund and Kolm (1995), Koskela and
Vilmunen (1996) and Kolm (1997) explore wage taxation in union bargaining
models, Hoel (1990), Pisauro (1991), Fuest and Huber (1997), Stiglitz (1999),
and Kleven and S¿rensen (1999) in e±ciency wage models, and Pissarides (1983,
1985 and 1990), Millard and Mortensen (1996) and Shi and Wen (1999) in search
models. Pissarides (1998) and S¿rensen (1999) investigate wage taxation in all
these three types of models.
This paper contributes to the literature on taxation in imperfect labour mar-
kets by exploring how the features of labour demand and labour supply impact
the optimal role of the tax system in correcting labour-market imperfections,
raising revenue, and correcting the income distribution. More speci¯cally, we
can identify six separate contributions. First, whereas the literature has largely
focused on tax reform, we explore the optimal design of the tax system. To
¤CentER, Tilburg University and CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
yCentER, Tilburg University and CEPR, London.
1illustrate, the literature on taxation in imperfect labour markets has demon-
strated that a more progressive tax system tends to cut unemployment (see,
e.g., Koskela and Vilmunen (1997) and Pissarides (1998)).1 Whereas recog-
nizing that a more progressive tax system may impose costs, this literature
has rarely explored the optimal trade o® between the costs and the bene¯ts
of a more progressive tax system.2 As another illustration, the literature has
demonstrated that ad valorum and speci¯c taxes yield di®erent allocative e®ects
if competition is imperfect (see Delipalla and Keen (1992)). This is in contrast
to competitive models in which ad valorum and speci¯c taxes exert the same
impact on prices and the allocation. In the context of imperfect labour mar-
kets, we show not only that the government can a®ect the distribution of the
tax burden over the demand and supply side of the market by varying the ad
valorum component of the wage tax but also how the government can employ
the tax system to optimally distribute the tax burden over both sides of the
market.3
Second, in investigating optimal taxation in imperfect labour markets, this
paper both simpli¯es and extends the workhorse of modern labour economics {
the search model developed by Mortensen and Pissarides (see, e.g., Pissarides
(1990) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)). The extensions of the model
a®ect the labour-supply and labour-demand elasticities, which are important
determinants of the optimal tax system. In particular, we allow for less than
in¯nitely elastic labour demand on account of non-linear vacancy costs. Hence,
in the extended model, not only labour supply (i.e. search by workers) but also
labour demand (i.e. search by entrepreneurs) is less than in¯nitely elastic. As a
direct consequence, not only workers but also entrepreneurs earn a positive ex-
ante surplus. The positive surplus enjoyed by entrepreneurs can be viewed as a
reward for supplying entrepreneurship. Incorporating less than in¯nitely elastic
labour demand is important for studying the ultimate incidence of taxation
over the demand and supply sides of the labour market and thus the optimal
distribution of the tax burden over the two sides of the labour market. Indeed,
we show that whether wage taxes (i.e. taxes on labour supply) are preferred
over pro¯t taxes (i.e. taxes on labour demand) depends crucially on the features
of search cost functions determining the elasticities of labour supply and labour
demand. These functions determine also the optimal progressiveness of a linear
wage tax.
As another extension, we allow agents to arbitrage between both sides of the
labour market in the long-run version of the extended model. Whereas non-
linear vacancy cost renders labour demand less elastic, the arbitrage possibility
tends to make behaviour more sensitive to tax incentives. Indeed, the addi-
tional behavioural margin opens up another channel through which taxes a®ect
e±ciency and distribution. We thus show how the optimal tax system depends
not only on the nature of search costs at both sides of the market but also on
the possibilities for arbitrage between these two sides.
We simplify the standard dynamic model by formulating a one-shot, static
1For empirical evidence con¯rming this result, see Lockwood and Manning (1993), Tyrvia-
nen (1995) and Graa°and and Huizinga (1999).
2For an exception, see S¿rensen (1999) who numerically explores optimal wage taxation in
imperfect labour markets.
3For the optimal design of commodity taxation in the presence of imperfect competition,
see Myles (1989) and Reinhorn (1999).
2version of the model. While it facilitates the interpretation of the results consid-
erably, the simpli¯ed model still contains the main determinants of the optimal
system. Most importantly, it retains the major market failure of the stan-
dard search model: search activities, which amount to speci¯c investments in a
labour-market relationship, are non-contractible and may thus be held up.
As a third contribution to the literature, we explore how the tax system,
by acting as a commitment device, can avoid hold up of search activities.4 By
e±ciently allocating property rights, the tax system in e®ect acts as a substi-
tute for complete contracts in protecting the appropriate incentives for search
activities. In this way, the tax system internalizes both positive and negative
search externalities.
Fourth, the paper analyses how the role of the tax system in alleviating
labour-market imperfections interacts with the revenue raising task of the tax
system. In this context, the paper is related to the literature on the interac-
tion between, on the one hand, distortionary taxation aimed at raising revenues
and, on the other hand, pollution taxes targeted at internalizing environmental
externalities (see Goulder (1995)). We ¯nd that the revenue raising and exter-
nality correcting tasks of the tax system are independent. One reason is that
the externalities directly a®ect the production side of the economy. Another
reason is constant returns to scale in matching. This implies that internaliz-
ing search externalities does not yield any net tax revenues because positive
and negative externalities balance exactly; the optimal tax system internalizing
these externalities merely redistributes resources from the side of the labour
market that imposes negative externalities (i.e. the side that is holding up the
other side) to the side of the market that yields positive externalities (i.e. the
side that is being held up). In the literature on environmental externalities, in
contrast, negative pollution externalities dominate so that the internalization of
these externalities through the tax system typically raises net revenues.5
A ¯fth contribution of this paper is that it explores the role of the tax system
in correcting the income distribution. By incorporating less than in¯nitely elas-
tic labour demand, we allow the tax system to redistribute resources between
the demand and supply sides of the labour market. In doing so, we decompose
the optimal tax system in three terms corresponding to the threefold task of
the tax system, namely to correct non-tax distortions (i.e. the missing markets
for search activity), to ¯nance government spending, and to correct the income
distribution.
As a ¯nal contribution to the literature, we study the conditions under which
the optimal tax system distorts labour-market tightness. The Diamond-Mirrlees
(1971) production e±ciency result suggests that labour-market tightness should
not be distorted. We show that this latter result holds in the standard model
with in¯nitely elastic labour demand due to linear vacancy costs and in a model
with symmetric search cost functions at both sides of the market. If these
conditions are violated, however, tightness will typically be distorted in order
to redistribute resources either within the private sector (i.e. between workers
4For other institutions that alleviate hold up of speci¯c investments in search, see Moen
(1997).
5For an exception, see Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998) who model the interaction
between pollution externalities and labour-market imperfections due to a rigid real after-
tax wage. Whereas correcting the labour-market imperfection calls for a wage subsidy, the
pollution externality demands a pollution tax. The overall e®ect on tax revenues is ambigious.
3and entrepreneurs) or from the private to the public sector.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 formulates a one-
shot, static version of the standard search model. Linear vacancy costs imply
that labour demand is in¯nitely elastic so that entrepreneurs do not reap any
(ex-ante) surplus. Workers, in contrast, enjoy positive ex-ante rents because
labour supply is less than in¯nitely elastic. The assumption of in¯nitely elastic
labour demand and less than in¯nitely elastic labour supply yields three major
implications. First, only the ad valorum component of the wage tax is employed
to raise government revenues. Second, in raising public revenues, the optimal
tax system does not distort labour-market tightness. Finally, the tax system
cannot redistribute from workers to entrepreneurs.
Section 3 extends this model by allowing for non-linear vacancy costs and
by keeping the number of entrepreneurs ¯xed. As a direct consequence, labour
demand becomes less than in¯nitely elastic and entrepreneurs reap a positive
surplus. Section 3 ¯nds that the three major implications of a model with linear
vacancy costs are not robust to the introduction of non-linear vacancy costs. In
particular, depending on the labour-demand elasticity, the speci¯c component
of the wage tax system takes over part or all of the revenue raising role of the ad
valorum component. Moreover, labour-market tightness may be distorted for
the purposes of either raising government revenues (i.e. redistributing resources
from the private to the public sector) or redistributing resources between workers
and entrepreneurs.
Section 4 maintains non-linear vacancy costs (and thus less than in¯nitely
elastic labour demand) but allows agents to arbitrage between the state of be-
ing a worker and that of being an entrepreneur. The model in section 4 can be
viewed as an intermediary case between the models of sections 2 and 3. On the
one hand, non-linear vacancy costs render labour demand less elastic than in
section 2. On the other hand, the arbitrage possibility between the two sides of
the labour market tends to make behaviour more sensitive to tax incentives than
in section 3. Indeed, compared to the model in section 3, this model implicitly
considers a longer time horizon during which the number of agents at both sides
of the market can respond to incentives. The implications of the model are also
in between those of sections 2 and 3. Just as in the case with linear vacancy costs
and free entry of entrepreneurs, long-term arbitrage between the two sides of
the market eliminates the role of the tax system in redistributing resources from
workers to entrepreneurs. With less than in¯nitely elastic labour demand, how-
ever, the optimal tax system may still want to distort labour-market tightness
for the purpose of raising public revenues. Moreover, with non-linear vacancy
costs, the government adopts not only the ad valorum component but also the
speci¯c component of the wage tax to raise revenues. The concluding section
5 summarizes the main results of the paper. The Appendix derives the results
presented in the main text.
2 Standard model with linear vacancy costs
2.1 model
This section describes the static search model. This model simpli¯es the dy-
namic model developed by Mortensen and Pissarides (see Pissarides (1990) and
4Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)) but still captures the major market failure
in the dynamic search model: the parties who bargain about the wage do not
internalize the impact of the negotiated wage on search activities. Hence, the
resulting equilibrium is e±cient only if the model meets the so-called Hosios
condition (see Hosios (1990)).
The sequencing of decisions in the static game is as follows. In the ¯rst
stage of the one-shot game, tax policy is set. In the second stage, workers
and ¯rms (or entrepreneurs or employers), which are unmatched, search for a
partner on the labour market. At the supply side of the labour market, workers
i 2 [0;1] select their search intensities 0 ￿ si ￿ 1 at a cost °(si), with °(0) = 0;
°0(0) = 0;°0(:) ¸ 0; °00(:) > 0; and limsi"1 °0(si) ! +1: At the demand side,
entrepreneurs simultaneously decide how many vacancies v to create. For each
vacancy posted, entrepreneurs bear a ¯xed cost c:
In the third stage of the game, workers and entrepreneurs are matched; the
number of matches equals m(s;v) where s =
R 1
0 sidi: The matching function
m(:;:) is increasing in its two arguments. Moreover, it exhibits constant returns
in both arguments together but decreasing returns in each of the arguments
separately. Since a Cobb Douglas matching function ¯ts the data rather well6,
we assume that the matching function is of the Cobb Douglas form.
After they have been matched, workers and entrepreneurs bargain about
the (after-tax) wage rate w in the fourth stage of the game. Workers and
entrepreneurs who do not ¯nd a match receive a payo® of zero. Finally, output
is produced, taxes are collected and tax revenues g are spent on a public good.
The crucial element in the sequencing of decisions is that wages are negoti-
ated after search e®orts at both side sides of the labour market have been sunk.
The quasi rents from the search activities are thus distributed on the basis of
ex-post bargaining power rather than the marginal e®ectiveness of search in gen-
erating matches. Accordingly, if the marginal productivity of search activities
exceeds the ex-post bargaining power, speci¯c investments in the match are held
up. This hold-up problem arises because the party with excessive bargaining
power cannot credibly commit to reward his partner according to her contri-
bution to concluding the match. Indeed, parties can bargain only after they
have met. Since contracts can thus only be signed after the contracting parties
have sunk their search activities, the market for search is missing. The missing
market for speci¯c investments in the match is the key non-tax distortion in the
model.
The model is solved backwards. Accordingly, before determining search
intensities s and labour-market tightness µ ´ v
s; we solve for (after-tax) wages.
2.1.1 production
The production technology in the ¯nal stage of the game is as follows: each
matched ¯rm-worker combination produces y units of output. Output is the
numeraire. Output net of search costs, W; is given by
W = m(s;v)y ¡ °(s) ¡ cv (1)
where m(s;v)y represents total output and °(s) + cv stands for total search
costs.
6See, e.g., Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and Broersma and Van Ours (1999).
5As usual in the labour market literature7, the public good is ¯nanced by a
linear tax on wages:8
g = m(s;v)(¿w + ¿a) (2)
Here, ¿ represents the proportional (or ad valorum) tax on wages. The other
component of the linear wage tax, ¿a; is a ¯xed (or speci¯c) tax on the match.
This tax depends only on the existence of a match and is not conditioned on how
the quasi-rents from the match are shared between ¯rms and workers. Wage
taxation is progressive (i.e. the average tax burden rises with the wage) if the
marginal tax on wages ¿ exceeds the average tax burden on wages
g
m(s;v)w: This
implies that the speci¯c tax ¿a is negative.
2.1.2 wage setting
As is common in search models of the labour market, wages are determined by
Nash bargaining between risk-neutral agents after a match has been found. The
threat points for both parties are zero.9 The bargaining is about the (after-tax)
quasi rent (or surplus) from the match, y ¡¿w¡¿a: The after-tax wage w that
maximizes the Nash Bargaining function w
¯





This is the value of the match for the worker. The value of a match for the
entrepreneur, ¼; amounts to
¼ ´ y ¡ (1 + ¿)w ¡ ¿a = (1 ¡ ¯)(y ¡ ¿a) (4)
The burden of the ¯xed tax component ¿a is shared between the worker (i.e.
the supply side of the labour market) and the ¯rm (i.e. the demand side of the
labour market) in proportion to their respective bargaining powers ¯ and (1¡¯);
after-tax wages w decline and before-tax wages (i.e. wage costs) w(1 + ¿) + ¿a
rise with ¿a. The proportional tax rate ¿, in contrast, reduces only the worker's
value of a match (3); before-tax wages w(1 + ¿) + ¿a and the ¯rm's value of
the match (4) are not a®ected by ¿. The proportional tax rate thus bears on
the supply side rather than the demand side of the labour market. Intuitively,
by taxing the quasi rents that accrue to workers (i.e. the after-tax wage w);
the proportional tax not only reduces the (after-tax) surplus from the match
but also raises the e®ective bargaining strength of employers.10 In the presence
of a higher proportional tax, employers bargain more aggressively because a
given increase in the after-tax wage w results in a larger increase in wage costs
7See for instance Pissarides (1990), Pissarides (1998) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1999).
8The government thus cannot resort to lump sum taxes to ¯nance its spending. Uniform
lump-sum taxes are excluded because the individuals who do not ¯nd a match do not have any
income to ¯nance these taxes. The government cannot impose di®erential lump-sum taxes
either because it does not know which agents will ¯nd a match when it sets tax policy in the
¯rst stage of the game.
9If the bargaining partners cannot agree, the match is dissolved and the parties collect the
same pay o® (of zero) as the workers and entrepreneurs who are not able to ¯nd a match. In
equilibrium, a match is never dissolved.
10The e®ective bargaining strength of employers is given by
(1¡¯)
¯=(1+¿)+(1¡¯):
6w(1 + ¿) + ¿a: Put di®erently, workers bargain less hard because, at a higher
proportional tax, a given rise in wage costs produces a smaller rise in after-tax
wages.11
2.1.3 search intensity and vacancies
The wage agreed upon in ex post bargaining (i.e. after the match has been con-
cluded) a®ects the incentives facing workers and ¯rms to search for a partner
in the preceding stage of the game. In selecting their search intensity, work-
ers trade o® additional search costs against the higher probability of ¯nding a
job. With a constant-returns-to-scale matching function, the probability that
a worker with search intensity si is matched with a ¯rm can be written as
a function of labour-market tightness only: si
s m(s;v) = sim(µ) where m(µ)
´ m(1;µ): The risk-neutral worker selects search intensity si so as to maximize




With homogeneous individuals, all households feature the same search intensity
°0(s) = m(µ)w (5)
where the left-hand side represents the marginal costs from higher search in-
tensity and the right-hand side the corresponding expected marginal bene¯t
in terms of raising the probability of ¯nding a job. The net expected surplus
for the worker, sm(µ)w ¡ °(s) = s°0(s) ¡ °(s); is positive (if search intensity
is non-zero) because of the properties of the strictly convex cost function (i.e.
°(0) = 0; °0(0) = 0; and °00(:) > 0):
The expression for optimal search intensity (5) can be interpreted as the
implicit labour supply equation. With the aid of (3), labour supply can alter-





Demand for labour is determined by ¯rms. The probability that a ¯rm is




µ : With free entry of ¯rms, expected







(1 ¡ ¯)(y ¡ ¿a) (7)
Here the left-hand side represents the costs of posting a vacancy while the
right-hand side stands for the ¯rm's expected bene¯ts of doing so. By reducing
the probability of ¯lling a vacancy
m(µ)
µ , a tighter labour market decreases the
expected bene¯ts from posting a vacancy. Since labour-market tightness µ is the
only endogenous variable in (7), the free-entry condition determines tightness
is a function of ¿a.
11There is thus no so-called 'real wage resistance' to proportional wage taxation. In com-
petitive models of the labour market, all components of the wage tax (i.e. including the ad
valorum component ¿ and the speci¯c component ¿a ) exert the same e®ect on the equilib-
rium wage. This is no longer the case in non-competitive labour-market models. In these
models, a more progressive tax structure tends to moderate wages and reduce equilibrium
unemployment (see Pissarides (1998) and S¿rensen (1999)).
72.2 optimal taxes without government spending
After it characterizes the social optimum, this section shows how the parameters
¿ and ¿a of a linear wage tax should be chosen such that the private outcome
coincides with the social optimum in the absence of a positive government ¯-
nancing requirement. The ¯nal part of this section demonstrates that a linear
wage tax is equivalent to a combination of proportional wage and pro¯t taxes.
Although not often employed in the labour market literature, the latter param-
eterization of the tax system is more convenient to work with when deriving
optimal taxes in the presence of positive government spending.
2.2.1 the Hosios condition
We measure welfare by net output (1). The social planner chooses search inten-
sity s and labour-market tightness µ to maximize welfare
max
s;µ
sm(µ)y ¡ °(s) ¡ cµs
It is routine to verify that the following result follows from the ¯rst order con-
ditions for s and µ.









The elasticity ´ measures the e®ectiveness of vacancies in generating matches.
Our assumption that the matching function is of the Cobb Douglas form implies
that ´ is constant.
Comparing the equations for the socially optimal labour demand (8) and
labour supply (9) with, respectively, the free entry condition (7) and privately
optimal search intensity (6) in the laissez fair equilibrium (i.e. ¿ = ¿a = 0), we
¯nd that the private outcome coincides with the social optimum if and only if
1 ¡ ¯ = ´ (10)
This so-called Hosios condition (see Hosios (1990)) states that the bargaining
power 1 ¡ ¯ of employers should be higher, the larger is the e®ectiveness of
employers in generating matches as measured by ´.
One can interpret the balance of (ex-post) power between the two sides of the
labour market that is implied by the Hosios condition as the e±cient distribution
of property rights over the fruits from search.12 In particular, search activities
12Alternatively, one can consider search externalities. By posting more vacancies, a ¯rm
reduces the probability that other ¯rms ¯nd a match but raises the probability that workers
¯nd a job. The lower ´, the bigger the negative external e®ects on the same side of the
market and the smaller the positive external e®ects on the other side of the market. The
Hosios condition states that a larger share of output should accrue to the side of the market
that causes the smallest negative and the largest positive search externalities.
8are speci¯c investments in a future relationship (i.e. a match) between a worker
and an employer. These speci¯c investments cannot be contracted on because
the worker and the ¯rm meet only after they have searched, i.e. after they
have sunk their investments in the relationship. The Hosios condition implies
that the party that carries out the most important non-contractible investments
should be most powerful ex post so that it can claim most of the quasi rents. In
this way, property rights act as a substitute for complete contracts in protecting
the incentives for speci¯c investments (see Hart (1995)).
The following result shows how the Hosios condition a®ects s and µ in the
private equilibrium.
Lemma 2 Consider the private outcome determined by (6) and (7) with ¿ =




(1 ¡ ´) = argmax
¯
fsm(µ)y ¡ °(s) ¡ cµsg
(1 ¡ ´) = argmax
¯
fsm(µ)w ¡ °(s)g
(1 ¡ ´) = argmax
¯
fsg
The ¯rst result says that labour market tightness is decreasing in workers'
bargaining power ¯. Intuitively, a higher ex-post bargaining power of workers
(i.e. labour supply) harms the incentives facing employers to demand labour
(i.e. post vacancies). The second result follows from lemma 1 and equation
(10): the private outcome coincides with the social optimum if ¯ = 1 ¡ ´.
With the free entry condition ensuring zero net pro¯ts in equilibrium, welfare
W in (1) coincides with the ex ante welfare of workers sm(µ)w ¡ °(s). This
implies the third result: the Hosios condition maximizes the ex-ante welfare of
workers. Accordingly, if workers could commit ex ante (i.e. before they start
searching for a job) to a wage setting rule, they would select the one implied
by the Hosios condition. Indeed, if the (ex-post) bargaining power of workers
¯ exceeds the e®ectiveness of workers in generating matches (1 ¡ ´), it is in
the ex-ante interest of workers to reduce their ex-post bargaining power so as
to boost labour demand and thus raise the probability of ¯nding a job. Hence,
from an ex-ante perspective of workers, the balance of power re°ected in the
Hosios condition is optimal.
The Hosios condition implies that the matching process is e±cient. This
maximizes the incentives of workers to participate in this matching process
through search. Accordingly, the Hosios condition maximizes the search inten-
sity of workers (i.e. the last result of the lemma above). If workers' bargaining
power is too weak (i.e. ¯ < (1¡´)), workers' search is depressed by excessively
low wages. If the bargaining power of workers is too strong (i.e. ¯ > (1 ¡ ´)),
workers are discouraged from looking for a job by a low probability of ¯nding a
job due to a lax labour market (as re°ected in a low value for tightness µ).
2.2.2 taxation restores e±ciency
If the division of bargaining power between the workers and the ¯rm deviates
from that required by the Hosios condition, tax policy can be used to restore
e±ciency. The following result holds for all the models in this paper.
9Lemma 3 With g = 0, a linear wage tax exists such that the social optimum
determined by (8) and (9) coincides with the private outcome (6) and (7). In
particular,
¿a =




1 ¡ ¯ ¡ ´
(1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ´)
(12)
restore the social optimum with a balanced government budget.
Wage taxation is progressive (¿a < 0 and ¿ > 0) if and only if workers hold
excessive bargaining power (i.e. ¯ > (1¡´)):13 Intuitively, the positive marginal
tax rate reduces the e®ective bargaining power of workers
¯=(1+¿)
¯=(1+¿)+(1¡¯) to its
social optimal value given by the Hosios condition (1¡´). By refunding the tax
revenues from the proportional tax as an e®ective subsidy to matches (¿a < 0),
the government ensures that employers face su±cient incentives to post the
socially optimally amount of vacancies. Indeed, if the ex-post bargaining power
of workers is too high, workers in e®ect levy an implicit tax on the speci¯c
investments of employers (i.e. the posting of vacancies) by expropriating part of
the marginal social bene¯ts of these investments. In other words, employers are
held up by workers. The government in e®ect undoes the implicit 'hold-up' tax
levied by workers on employers through explicit taxes and subsidies; it levies an
explicit tax on workers to ¯nance an explicit subsidy to employers.
Tax policy, which is set before search activities are determined, allows work-
ers to commit not to expropriate entrepreneurs. In this way, tax policy e®ec-
tively creates the market for search that is missing in the laissez fair equilibrium.
Before they meet each other after they match, tax policy and tax enforcement in
e®ect allows workers and entrepreneurs to conclude a contract stipulating that
their search activities will be rewarded according to the marginal contribution
to the match. Indeed, if workers would vote on the tax rate in the ¯rst stage of
the game (i.e. when they are still unmatched), they would vote for the optimal
social contract (i.e. the optimal allocation of property rights) implicit in the
optimal tax structure.
The intuition for the balanced government budget is as follows. Since the
matching function features constant returns to scale, the output of the matches
is exhausted exactly in providing the proper marginal incentives to the providers
of inputs. Hence, tax policy only redistributes resources from the side of the
market with excessive bargaining power in the laissez fair equilibrium to the
other side of the market without generating any net revenues to the govern-
ment. In other words, through its explicit tax policy, the government undoes
the implicit tax levied by the excessively strong side of the market on the ex-
cessively weak side. The explicit tax on the activity generating negative search
externalities (this activity in e®ect bene¯ts from an implicit subsidy) is just suf-
¯cient to ¯nance an explicit subsidy on the activity that yields positive search
13As in most non-competitive models of the labour market, a more progressive tax system
will tend to reduce involuntary unemployment by raising the number of matches. However, a
more progressive tax system is not neccesarily e±cient as vacancy costs are ine±ciently high
and search intensity of workers is ine±ciently low. This shows how a more progressive tax
system, while it may reduce involuntary unemployment, can be ine±cient.
10externalities (this activity in e®ect su®ers from an implicit tax); the positive
search externalities and negative search externalities balance exactly.
With decreasing returns in matching, matching would produce a rent. In
that case, the government could employ its tax policy to transfer this surplus
to the government budget without distorting search decisions. With increasing
returns in matching, in contrast, the taxes required to produce e±cient matching
would yield a de¯cit for the government: the output from the match would
not be su±cient to reward the searching parties according to their marginal
contributions in producing the match.
2.2.3 pro¯t and wage taxation
We have parameterized the tax system by the two parameters characterizing a
linear wage tax ¿ and ¿a. For the interpretation of the results in the rest of
this paper, however, it turns out to be more convenient to write the tax system
as a combination of proportional wage and pro¯t taxes. We can do so without
any loss of generality because a linear wage tax is equivalent to an appropriate
mix of a proportional wage tax and a proportional pro¯t tax (for which search
costs are not deductible). The proportional pro¯t tax can be interpreted also
as a tax on entrepreneurial income.
g = m(s;v)[¿ww + ¿¼¼] (13)
where ¿¼ stands for the proportional tax on (after-tax) pro¯ts (or income ac-
cruing to labour demand) and ¿w represents the proportional tax on (after-tax)
wages (or labour income or income accruing to labour supply). The pro¯t tax
¿¼ is the analogue of the proportional wage tax for the demand side of the
labour market. Just as the proportional tax ¿ causes workers to bargain less
aggressively, the proportional pro¯t tax ¿¼ induces entrepreneurs to act less ag-
gressively in wage bargaining because this policy instrument taxes away part of
the quasi rents captured by entrepreneurs. Hence, just as a higher proportional
wage tax ¿w reduces only the quasi rents accruing to workers (i.e. the after-tax
wage w) and leaves una®ected the quasi rents accruing to entrepreneurs (i.e.
¼); the proportional pro¯t tax ¿¼ reduces only the quasi rents captured by the
demand side ¼ and does not impact the quasi rents captured by the supply side
w. The following result is routine to verify.
Lemma 4 With Nash bargaining, proportional pro¯t and wage taxes yield the









Furthermore, the proportional wage and pro¯t taxes are related to parameters of









11Finally, the following values for ¿w and ¿¼
¿¼ =




1 ¡ ¯ ¡ ´
1 ¡ ´
(19)
cause the private outcome to coincide with the social optimum while balancing
the government budget.
The proportional wage and pro¯t taxes that restore the social optimum can
be interpreted in terms of the optimal taxation of labour demand and labour
supply. In particular, the proportional pro¯t tax can be viewed as a direct tax
on labour demand (i.e. abstracting from general equilibrium e®ects on labour-
market tightness µ). The proportional wage tax, in contrast, can be interpreted
as a direct tax on labour supply. Labour demand should be taxed (i.e. the
pro¯t tax ¿¼ should be positive) if labour demand is excessive compared to
labour supply (i.e. µ is too high because 1¡¯ > ´): If labour supply is too large
compared to demand (i.e. µ is too low because ¯ > 1 ¡ ´); in contrast, labour
supply should be taxed (i.e. the proportional wage tax ¿ should be positive).
The results can be interpreted also in terms of the distortions due to imper-
fect competition. If entrepreneurs (the demand side) hold excessive bargaining
power (i.e. 1 ¡ ¯ > ´ and µ is too high), the market su®ers from monopsony
power. A subsidy to supply o®sets the implicit tax imposed by the entrepreneurs
who hold excessive market power. This subsidy is ¯nanced by a tax on monop-
sony pro¯ts. Similarly, if workers exercise too much power ex post (i.e. ¯ > 1¡´
and µ is too low), the market can be characterized as being monopolized. Tax
policy corrects the associated monopoly distortions by levying a tax on the
monopoly pro¯ts to ¯nance a subsidy on labour demand. In this way, tax
policy undoes the implicit taxes imposed by the party with excessive market
power.
2.3 optimal taxes with positive government spending
This section allows for a positive government ¯nancing requirement (i.e. g > 0,
see (2)). Welfare (1) can be written in the following way.
Lemma 5
W = sm(µ)w ¡ °(s) + g (20)
= s°0(s) ¡ °(s) + g
With the free entry condition ensuring a zero expected return for entrepreneurs,
welfare consists of the ex ante return to workers sm(µ)w¡°(s) and the resources
allocated to the government g: The second equality follows from (6).
The social planner chooses the optimal tax rates so as to maximize net
welfare (20) subject to the government budget constraint (2). After exploring
the resulting optimal tax structure, we discusse the marginal cost of public
funds.
122.3.1 optimal tax structure
In exploring the optimal tax structure for ¯nancing a positive government's
revenue requirement g > 0;we ¯rst introduce the following notation.
We de¯ne the following overall tax rates
^ ¿a ´ ¿a + ¸ ¿a (21)








(¿w + ¸ ¿w) (24)
where the implicit tax rates are de¯ned as
¸ ¿a ´ ¡




1 ¡ ¯ ¡ ´
(1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ´)
(26)
¸ ¿¼ ´ ¡




1 ¡ ¯ ¡ ´
1 ¡ ´
(28)
The overall taxes are de¯ned in deviation of their ¯rst best values. The idea is
that the government ¯rst corrects for the search externalities (a balanced budget
correction) and then sets the overall taxes (the taxes with a hat) to optimally
raise the positive revenue requirement g. As an illustration, the overall speci¯c
tax ^ ¿a equals the explicit tax ¿a minus the ¯rst-best tax that corrects for hold
up
1¡¯¡´
1¡¯ (see (11)). The proportional wage and pro¯t taxes ^ ¿w and ^ ¿¼ can be
written as
^ ¿w =





The overall labour tax revenue from a match ^ ¿ww thus equals the di®erence
between labour's Hosios share of output, (1 ¡ ´)y, and the net wage a worker
receives. Similarly, the overall pro¯t tax revenue amounts to the di®erence
between the entrepreneur's Hosios share, ´y, and the net pro¯t received by an
entrepreneur.
First, we characterize the optimal tax structure in terms of the proportional
tax rates ^ ¿w and ^ ¿¼.
Proposition 6 The optimal overall taxes ^ ¿w and ^ ¿¼, which ¯nance government
expenditure g, satisfy
^ ¿¼¼ = 0
^ ¿ww = ¹ g
where ^ ¿w is increasing in "s and g; and ¹ g is de¯ned as ¹ g ´
g
sm(µ):
13The government employs only the proportional wage tax to ¯nance govern-
ment spending per match ¹ g. The intuition behind this result is the following.
The free entry condition and linear vacancy costs imply that the demand for
labour is in¯nitely elastic. Hence, Ramsey considerations suggest that the over-
all tax on labour demand, ^ ¿¼; should be zero. In particular, due to in¯nitely
elastic labour demand, entrepreneurs are able to shift the entire burden of this
tax on the demand side onto the supply side. Thus, whereas a tax on labour
supply, ¿w, taxes the supply side directly through a lower after-tax wage w, a tax
on labour demand ¿¼ is also borne by labour supply { albeit indirectly, namely
through the general equilibrium e®ect of a less tight labour market reducing the
probability of ¯nding a job. It is more e±cient to tax workers directly through
¿w than indirectly through the general equilibrium e®ect on µ; both ways distort
search intensity but the second way also distorts labour-market tightness.
This result is closely related to the celebrated Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) re-
sult on the optimality of production e±ciency. With constant returns to scale
production (or tax instruments to tax away rents due to decreasing returns)
and su±cient tax instruments to tax consumers directly, the government should
ensure production e±ciency. The government ¯nds it optimal to tax consumers
directly through consumer taxes rather than indirectly through taxes that vi-
olate production e±ciency. Similarly, in the current context, the government
should not distort labour-market tightness, µ, through the pro¯t tax ^ ¿¼: In-
deed, keeping labour-market tightness at its ¯rst-best level can be viewed as
maintaining e±ciency in the production of matches.
Using the relationship between the proportional taxes ¿w;¿¼ and parameters
of a linear wage tax ¿a;¿ (see (16) and (17)), one can easily verify the following
result.
Corollary 7 The optimal taxes ^ ¿ and ^ ¿a, which ¯nance the government expen-
diture g, satisfy
^ ¿a = 0 (29)
and ^ ¿ is increasing in g and "s.
The ¯xed component of the tax, ¿a, is thus set at its ¯rst-best level (11).
Accordingly, only the ad valorum component, ¿; is used as an instrument to
¯nance positive government spending. The intuition is the same as above, since
¿ is a tax on labour supply only, while ¿a taxes labour demand as well.
2.3.2 marginal cost of public funds
The marginal cost of public funds ¹ represents the shadow value of government




fsm(µ)w ¡ °(s) + g + ¹[sm(µ)(¿ww + ¿¼¼) ¡ g]g (30)
Lemma 8 The marginal cost of public funds equals
¹ =
1
(1 ¡ "s¹ ¿)
(31)
14where ¹ ¿ ´ ¿ww+¿¼¼
w denotes the average tax burden expressed in terms of the





stands for the elasticity of the search inten-
sity of workers with respect to the rewards to search. Let gm denote the value




subject to (5), (7), (14) and (15)











The marginal cost of public funds thus rises with both the elasticity "s; which
can be interpreted as the labour-supply elasticity, and the average tax burden
¹ ¿: Since labour demand is in¯nitely elastic, only the labour-supply elasticity "s
features in the expression for the marginal costs of public funds. In a model
with inelastic labour supply ("s = 0), the marginal cost of public funds equals
unity. In that case, the government can tax away the ex-ante surplus of workers,
(1 ¡ ´)y, without distorting incentives.
The marginal cost of public funds equals unity also if the average tax burden
is zero (i.e. if the government ¯nancing requirement g is zero). This is a direct
consequence of constant returns to scale in matching, which implies that output
of the match is exhausted exactly in providing the proper marginal incentives
for search at both sides of the market. Taxing away some of the output of the
match necessarily implies that the incentives for ¯nding a match are distorted.
These distortions in search raise the marginal cost of public funds above unity.
The marginal cost of public funds becomes in¯nite if the average tax burden
¹ ¿ equals the reciprocal of the elasticity of labour supply, 1="s: By imposing a
mark up according to the inverse elasticity rule, the government acts as a mo-
nopolist who maximizes its revenues. The tax burden ¹ ¿m = 1="s thus ¯nances
the maximum revenue requirement gm that can be ¯nanced.14 The larger is the
elasticity of labour supply, the smaller becomes the maximum revenue require-
ment that can be ¯nanced.
The marginal cost of public funds does not a®ect the explicit taxes correct-
ing for the search externalities (see (25), (26), (27), and (28)). This is di®erent
from optimal pollution taxes o®setting negative consumption externalities due
to pollution. These taxes decline with the marginal cost of public funds (see
Bovenberg and De Mooij (1994)). If pollution externalities harm the produc-
tion side of the economy, in contrast, the marginal cost of public funds does not
14The appendix shows three (equivalent) ways to calculate the maximal revenue requirement
gm. First, at the maximal revenue requirement, ¹ tends to in¯nity. Second, one can solve
for the maximal revenue requirement while calculating the optimal tax incidence. Third, at
the maximal revenue requirement, the determinant of the matrix of the system of linearized
equations determining the private outcome becomes zero.
15a®ect the optimal pollution taxes correcting for these negative externalities (see
Bovenberg and Van der Ploeg (1998)). Also in our model, the (search) exter-
nalities a®ect the production side of the economy (i.e. the matching process).
Accordingly, the marginal cost of public funds does not enter the expressions
for the optimal externality correcting taxes.
3 Non-linear vacancy costs
The previous section established that only the supply side of the labour market
should be taxed to ¯nance government spending so that additional government
spending leaves labour-market tightness una®ected. This result depends cru-
cially on two important assumptions, namely ¯rst, the free entry condition for
entrepreneurs (7) and, second, the linear character of vacancy costs. These two
assumptions imply that the net surplus of entrepreneurs is zero in equilibrium.
Hence, the resources required to ¯nance government spending can come only
out of the surplus collected at the supply side by workers.
In order to explore the robustness of the results derived in the previous
section, this section modi¯es these two assumptions by allowing for non-linear
vacancy costs and a ¯xed number of entrepreneurs.15 The linear vacancy costs
assumed in the previous section imply that labour demand is in¯nitely elastic
with respect to wage costs. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that labour






that is less than in¯nite is thus more relevant from
an empirical point of view. With less than in¯nitely elastic labour demand,
entrepreneurs are no longer able to fully shift the burden of taxes on labour
demand. Hence, the government may want to tax the demand side of the labour
market to redistribute resources to the public sector or to workers. This section
formalizes these insights.
3.1 model
The model presented in section 2 is adapted in two ways. First, there are a
¯xed number of entrepreneurs j 2 [0;1]. Second, each entrepreneur selects her
search intensity 0 ￿ vj ￿ 1 at a cost c(vj) where the function c(:) is increasing
and concave (c(0) = 0; c0(0) = 0;c0(:) ¸ 0; c00(:) > 0; and limvj"1 c0(vj) ! +1).
Hence, just as the intensity s with which workers search for a job, the intensity v
with which entrepreneurs look for an employee is subject to increasing marginal
costs. The rising nature of marginal search costs c(vj) can be motivated by
the entrepreneur inelastically providing a production factor (like supervision or
entrepreneurship) in the search process. We adopt the interpretation of this
¯xed factor as being entrepreneurship and come back to this interpretation in
section 4.
15The case with non-linear vacancy costs and free entry of ¯rms is equivalent to the model
in the previous section. To see this, note that in this case the number of vacancies per ¯rm ¹ v
is ¯xed by the condition c0(¹ v) =
c(¹ v)
¹ v , that is average cost per vacancy should be minimized.
Pissarides (1990: 76) ¯nds the same condition in a dynamic version of the model. The total
number of vacancies posted v equals ¹ v times the number of ¯rms that enter. Free entry then
implies that c(¹ v) =
m(µ)
µ ¼ which is the same condition as in section 2.







¼ ¡ c(vj)g (32)
where labour market tightness is de¯ned as µ ´ v
s. With homogeneous en-
trepreneurs, all entrepreneurs feature the same search intensity determined by















Substituting (33) into (32), we ¯nd that the surplus reaped by entrepreneurs
is vc0(v) ¡ c(v): The rising marginal vacancy costs (i.e. c00(v) > 0 and c0(0) =
c(0) = 0) imply that this surplus is positive at non-zero vacancy intensity v > 0:
This positive surplus can be viewed as a reward for entrepreneurship.
If the social planner attaches equal weight to the surplus of workers and
that of entrepreneurs, she chooses the search intensities s and v to maximize
net output
max
s;v m(s;v)y ¡ °(s) ¡ c(v) (34)
As above, the economy still su®ers from a missing market for the search
intensities s and v: In order to reward these speci¯c investments according to
their contributions to net output, the government needs to subsidize the side of
the labour market that is being held up and tax the side that is holding up. With
constant-returns-to-scale matching, the optimal rewards exhaust output so that
the optimal tax policy does not yield any net revenues to the government. This
can be summarized as follows.
Lemma 9 If g = 0 and if the social planner attaches equal weight to the sur-
pluses of workers and entrepreneurs, then the linear wage tax implied by ¿a and
¿ in equations (11) and (12) or equivalently the proportional pro¯t and wage
taxes ¿¼ and ¿w in (18) and (19) ensure that the private outcome coincides
with the social optimum while maintaining a balanced government budget.
3.2 optimal taxes with positive government spending and
distributional considerations
The main di®erence with the model with linear vacancy costs is that the optimal
tax policy no longer maximizes the search intensity of workers, s: With a positive
ex-ante surplus for entrepreneurs, net output can be written as the sum of the
surpluses accruing to workers, entrepreneurs and the government. This gives us
the opportunity to introduce distributional considerations for the social planner.
In particular, we assume that the social planner wants to maximize
W® = ®[sm(µ)w ¡ °(s)] + [sm(µ)¼ ¡ c(v)] + g (35)
17where ® denotes the weight the planner attaches to the ex ante welfare of work-
ers.16
Lemma 10 Welfare W® can be written as
W® = ®[s°0(s) ¡ °(s)] + [vc0(v) ¡ c(v)] + g
Given exogenous government spending g; optimal tax policy no longer opti-
mizes the surplus for workers (and hence search intensity s) but instead trades
o® a maximal surplus for workers s°0(s) ¡ °(s) against a maximal surplus for
entrepreneurs c0(v)v ¡ c(v) (and hence a maximal search intensity v):
The next result characterizes the optimal tax policy if the government fea-
tures a positive revenue requirement (g > 0 in (2)) and cares about the distri-
bution between workers and entrepreneurs.
Theorem 11 A social planner designing a tax system that maximizes W® while
collecting su±cient tax revenues to ¯nance the revenue requirement g chooses a
tax system with the following characteristics
^ ¿ww = ³¹ g + » (36)








































The expressions for the optimal proportional wage and pro¯t taxes (36)
and (37) show that the optimal tax rates can be decomposed in three terms
corresponding to the threefold task of the tax system, namely to correct non-
tax distortions (i.e. to internalize the search externalities by introducing the
missing markets for search activity as re°ected in the implicit taxes ¸ ¿w and
¸ ¿p), to ¯nance government spending (i.e. to redistribute from the private to
the public sector as re°ected in the parameter ³), and to correct the income
distribution (i.e. to redistribute within the private sector between workers and
entrepreneurs as re°ected in the parameter »). We explore these three roles of
the tax system in turn.
16We assume that the government ¯nancing requirement g is exogenously given. Alterna-
tively, we could endogenously determine g by attaching a welfare weight to g in expression
(35).
183.2.1 optimal correction of search externalities
The non-tax distortions, which are represented by the implicit taxes ¸ ¿p and ¸ ¿w
(see equations (27) and (28)) enter the formulas additively. They only a®ect the
de¯nitions of the overall tax wedges ^ ¿¼ and ^ ¿w while leaving the formulas for
the optimal relationship between these overall tax wedges una®ected (see the
notation introduced in (23) and (24)).
Whereas the optimal tax rates thus feature the so-called additivity property
(see Sandmo (1976)), the dichotomy between the revenue-raising task of the tax
system and its role in correcting search externalities is even stronger than in
the case of other non-tax distortions. First, the externality correcting role of
the tax system does not depend on the revenue-raising task of the tax system.
The reason is that, in the presence of production externalities due to hold up,
the externality correcting parts ¸ ¿w and ¸ ¿p do not depend on the government
¯nancing requirement.17 Second, the revenue-raising task does not depend on
the search externalities because correcting these distortions does not impact
the government revenue requirement; the net tax revenues from the associated
externality correcting taxes are zero. Hence, the missing market for search
activities does not a®ect the optimal values for ^ ¿¼ and ^ ¿w.
3.2.2 optimal revenue raising
In order to investigate the revenue raising role of the tax system, we explore
the speci¯c case in which the government does not exhibit any distributional
preferences.
Corollary 12 If the government does not feature any distributional preferences







The optimal taxes in terms of the government ¯nancing requirement are given
by
^ ¿ww = ³¹ g












(1 ¡ "¹ ¿)
(39)
and







17This is correct only if ´ does not depend on labour-market tightness (as is the case with
a Cobb Douglas matching function). The marginal cost of public funds enters the formulas
for taxes correcting for consumption externalities (see Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994)).






"vg¡1 denotes the weighted harmonic average of the
demand and supply elasticities, ¹ ¿ ´ ¿ww+¿¼¼
w+¼ the average tax burden expressed
in terms of after-tax incomes, and ¹ gm government expenditure per match that
maximizes overall government expenditure g = sm(µ)¹ g.
Optimal tax rates Equation (38) is the Ramsey rule. The relative overall
tax rates on labour demand and labour supply are inversely related to their
elasticities. In particular, if the demand elasticity "v is large compared to the
supply elasticity "s; the overall tax rate on labour supply ^ ¿w should be relatively
large. At the optimum, a marginal redistribution of tax money from the demand
side of the labour market to the supply side (which would raise labour supply
depending on the supply elasticity "s and reduce labour demand depending
on the demand elasticity "v) should leave una®ected overall tax revenues (i.e.
including the implicit tax revenues), thus ^ ¿w"s¡ ^ ¿¼"v = 0:
The roles of the two taxes in raising government revenues is implicit in the
parameter ³ which stands for the share of government spending ¯nanced by
taxes on workers. This share ³ rises with both the relative elasticity of labour
demand (i.e. "v="s) and the relative size of the tax base of a tax on workers
(i.e. w=¼):
We can write the optimal tax system also in terms of a linear wage tax by
using lemma 4 and (38). This yields
Corollary 13 If the government does not feature any distributional preferences
(® = 1); the optimal tax system is characterized by the following restriction
"s^ ¿ = ^ ¿a ("v ¡ "s) (40)
Expression (40) reveals that the result in corollary 7, that only the ad valo-
rum tax is employed to ¯nance government spending, depends crucially on the
assumption of linear vacancy costs; only if labour demand is in¯nitely elastic
("v ! +1); is the marginal tax rate ^ ¿ used to ¯nance government spending
(^ ¿a = 0): In fact, this result of exclusive reliance on ^ ¿ rather than ^ ¿a is exactly
reversed if demand and supply elasticities coincide ("s = "v). In that case, only
the speci¯c tax component is used for ¯nancing spending (^ ¿ = 0): Intuitively,
the speci¯c tax amounts to an equal tax on both labour demand and supply.
Such a tax is optimal if supply and demand elasticities are equal. The ad val-
orum tax ^ ¿; which acts like a tax on labour supply only, is optimal if labour
supply is in¯nitely inelastic compared to demand ("s="v ! 0):
marginal cost of public funds Just as in the case with linear vacancy costs
(see (31)), the marginal cost of public funds depends on both the government ¯-
nancing requirement (i.e. the average tax burden) and the sensitivity of private
behaviour as re°ected in the magnitude of elasticities. In contrast to the case
with linear vacancy costs, however, the labour-demand elasticity enters explic-
itly. In particular, a ¯nite demand elasticity helps to contain the marginal cost
of public funds. The marginal cost of public funds is increasing in the demand
and supply elasticities. Intuitively, larger elasticities imply that labour-market
behaviour is more sensitive to distorted price signals. Hence, taxes exert larger
distortionary e®ects on this behaviour.
20The marginal cost of public funds does not exceed unity if either demand or
supply is inelastic (i.e. "s = 0 or "v = 0): In that case, the government can in
e®ect levy a lump-sum tax, which does not a®ect behaviour.18 The marginal
cost of public funds is unity also for the ¯rst dollar of revenue raised. The reason
is that the externality correcting taxes do not raise any government revenue with
constant returns to scale in matching.
In order to explore the maximum government spending that can be ¯nanced,
we note that "¹ ¿ = ^ ¿w"s = ^ ¿¼"v by using the Ramsey rule (38): The marginal
cost of public funds thus becomes in¯nite if the government acts like a mo-
nopolist (by adopting the inverse elasticity rules ^ ¿w = "¡1
s and ^ ¿¼ = "¡1
v )
by extracting the maximal surplus from the private sector. At the maximal






1+"v. The maximal government size is zero if both labour sup-
ply and labour demand are in¯nitely elastic. If both demand and supply are
perfectly inelastic, in contrast, the entire output can be taxed away.
labour-market tightness With linear vacancy costs, the government rev-
enue requirement does not a®ect labour-market tightness µ. The next result
shows that with non linear vacancy costs raising a positive revenue requirement
can a®ect labour-market tightness.















Increasing a positive initial revenue requirement thus strengthens the side of
the market that is subject to the highest overall tax rate, that is the inelastic
side of the market. To illustrate, if labour supply is relatively inelastic (i.e.
"s < "v and hence ^ ¿¼
^ ¿w < 1), the labour-market becomes less tight (i.e. supply
increases compared to demand) if the government needs to raise more revenue.
Intuitively, with inelastic labour supply, the government relies relatively heavily
on wage taxation ¿w to ¯nance its spending. Thus, wages are a more important
tax base than pro¯ts. In order to protect wages as a tax base, the government
raises wage income at the expense of labour-market e±ciency. Indeed, as a
stakeholder in wage income, the government shares an interest with workers
in monopolizing the labour market. Hence, to protect its interest in revenue
raising, the government endows workers with a larger e®ective bargaining power
than is implicit in the Hosios condition. In this way, labour-market tightness
is distorted for the purpose of raising public revenue, i.e. for redistributing
resources from the private to the public sector. The side of the market that
provides the largest revenue base to the government has excessive bargaining
power and thus expands compared to the other side.19
18These lump-sum taxes, however, are limited by the sizes of the tax base. That is, ´y in
the case of pro¯t taxation on inelastic demand ("v = 0) and (1 ¡ ´)y in the case of wage
taxation on inelastic labour supply ("s = 0):
19Another way to see this, is the following. At very small revenue requirements (at
which ^ ¿w and ^ ¿¼ are close to zero so that w = (1 ¡ ´)y and ¼ = ´y), the wage






: At the highest government ¯nancing requirement
that can be ¯nanced (at which ^ ¿w = "¡1
s and ^ ¿¼ = "¡1
v ); this share amounts to ³ =
21Labour-market tightness is not distorted in a number of cases. First, the
¯rst dollar of revenue raised does not imply a ¯rst-order e®ect on tightness. The
reason is that the e®ect on the tax base is then only second order. Hence, no
¯rst-order distortions in the labour-market are needed to protect the tax base.
Labour-market tightness is also not distorted if labour demand and supply are
equally elastic. If supply and demand respond symmetrically, there is no reason
to distort the power balance between workers and entrepreneurs. Finally, in
case either demand or supply are in¯nitely elastic, tightness does not depend
on the government ¯nancing requirement. In that case, the government does
not have any market power to protect the inelastic side because the other side
is in¯nitely elastic. Hence, the tax burden is always born by the inelastic side
of the market; the elastic side can fully escape it.20
3.2.3 optimal redistribution
optimal taxation The redistributional role of the tax system is implicit in
the term » in (36) and (37). The impact of the elasticities on this term is closely
related to the corresponding impact on the marginal cost of public funds ¹ in
(39); whereas the marginal cost of public funds involves redistribution from
the private to the public sector, the term » is associated with redistribution
within the private sector. If both labour supply and demand are in¯nitely elas-
tic, redistribution becomes prohibitively expensive and the redistribution term
» becomes zero while the marginal cost of public funds (39) becomes in¯nite.
More generally, the absolute size of the redistribution term (the marginal cost
of public funds) is inversely (positively) related to the supply and demand elas-
ticities "s and "v: Higher elasticities indicating that behaviour is more sensitive
to tax distortions implies that redistribution (either within or away from the
private sector) becomes more costly. Hence, e±ciency considerations prevent
substantial redistribution from the demand to the supply side (or from the pri-
vate sector to the government).
The distributional term depends also on the parameter ®; which represents
the distributional preference for workers. If the government cares only about
workers (i.e. ® ! +1); the optimal pro¯t tax from (37) is given by the inverse
elasticity rule ^ ¿¼ = "¡1
v : This tax system maximizes the ex-ante surplus of
workers and hence the search activity at the supply side of the labour market.
labour-market tightness If labour demand is less than in¯nitely elastic
("v < +1); a tax policy that maximizes the surplus for workers violates the Ho-
sios condition (even if the government ¯nancing requirement g is zero). Indeed,
workers would vote for a positive overall tax on labour demand ^ ¿¼ > 0. By levy-
ing a positive tax on the speci¯c investments of entrepreneurs, workers extract
some of the rents enjoyed by entrepreneurs (i.e. the reward to entrepreneurship).








v )): Accordingly, at a low government ¯nancing requirement,
di®erences in demand and supply elasticities exert a larger impact on the relative shares ¯-
nanced by the two sides (if the elasticities ´;"s;and "v are constant). Again we ¯nd that the
desire to tax the least elastic side most heavily to reduce distortions in private behaviour is
o®set by the desire to protect the tax base.
20Hence, if the demand elasticity exceeds the supply elasticity, the labour market is monop-
olized as long as the demand elasticity is less than in¯nite.
22on entrepreneurs (which rise with the initial tax ^ ¿¼ and take the form of a less
tight labour market and more unemployment) against the rents captured from
the demand side (which rise with the reciprocal of the labour demand elasticity
"¡1
v and accrue in the form of higher after-tax wages).
In the equilibrium that maximizes the surplus for workers, the labour market
is monopolized. Hence, from a pure e±ciency point of view (that is, considering
® = 1), the labour market is not tight enough. At the margin, the e±ciency
costs exactly balance the distributional bene¯ts. More generally, if the gov-
ernment cares more about workers than about entrepreneurs (i.e. ® > 1 but
not necessarily in¯nite), the labour market su®ers from monopoly power at a
zero government ¯nancing requirement (and a less than in¯nite labour demand
elasticity "v).21 In contrast, if the government attaches a higher weight to the
surplus of entrepreneurs than that of workers (and if the labour supply elasticity
"s is less than in¯nite) then the labour market is monopsonized (i.e. ^ ¿w > 0 so
that the labour market is too tight from an e±ciency point of view). Accord-
ingly, even without a revenue requirement, labour-market tightness is distorted
{ not for redistributing resources from the private to the public sector but for
redistribution within the private sector. Monopoly and monopsony distortions
are the price for redistribution. Unlike the case with linear vacancy costs, voters
no longer agree on the optimal tax policy. Compared to workers, entrepreneurs
vote for a higher tax on workers and a lower tax on entrepreneurs to protect the
rewards for the ¯xed factor supplied by them.
4 Endogenous worker-entrepreneur choice
In the previous section, the government could freely redistribute resources be-
tween workers and entrepreneurs without inducing agents to move between the
demand and supply sides of the labour market. This seems a strong assumption
{ especially in the long run. In this section, therefore, we allow agents to arbi-
trage between being an entrepreneur and being a worker in a new ¯rst stage of
the game. At the same time, as in the previous section, we allow for less than
in¯nitely elastic labour demand.
Compared to the standard model outlined in section 2, agents can freely
enter and exit not only the demand side of the labour market but also the supply
side. Moreover, in entering the labour market as an entrepreneur and demand
labour, the agents face the alternative of becoming a worker and supply labour.
In contrast to section 2, therefore, the ex-ante value of being an entrepreneur
is endogenously determined rather than being exogenously ¯xed at zero. As
an other di®erence with section 2, non-linear vacancy costs imply that labour
demand is ¯nitely elastic with respect to wage costs.
The model discussed in this section can therefore be viewed as an intermedi-
ate case between the model of section 2, in which entrepreneurs can freely enter
the economy and labour demand is in¯nitely elastic, and that of section 3, in
which the number of entrepreneurs is ¯xed and labour demand is ¯nitely elastic.
Compared to section 3, the additional margin on which agents can respond to
21At an in¯nite demand elasticity (as in the standard model), distributional preferences do
not a®ect the optimal tax system. Intuitively, with in¯nitely elastic demand, the supply side
cannot capture any rents from the demand side.
23incentives (the worker-entrepreneur decision) puts an additional constraint on
tax policy.
4.1 model
The population of agents is modelled as the unit interval [0;1]: The ratio of
entrepreneurs to workers is denoted by ¸: Accordingly, the proportion of the
population that chooses to become entrepreneur is given by ¸=(1 + ¸) and the
share of the population that becomes worker by 1=(1+¸): Labour market tight-





Labour-market tightness is thus a®ected not only by the search intensities at
both sides of the market, v and s, but also by the proportion of the population
that chooses to become entrepreneur, ¸.
4.1.1 decentralized equilibrium
Solving the model backwards, we note that the production stage and the wage
bargaining process are the same as in the models discussed previously. The
¯rst-order condition for the optimal search intensity at the supply side is still
given by (6) and that for optimal search intensity at the demand side by (33).
A new stage is introduced in which agents decide whether to become a worker
(and search for a job) or to become an entrepreneur (and post vacancies).22 Ac-
cordingly, in contrast to the model of the previous section, the number of agents
at both sides of the labour market is endogenous. The following expression de-
scribes the ¯rst stage of the game in which agents choose whether to enter the
labour market on the demand side as an entrepreneur or on the supply side as
a worker:
sm(µ)w ¡ °(s) = v
m(µ)
µ
¼ ¡ c(v) (42)
Arbitrage ensures that the ex-ante value of being a worker (the left-hand side
of (42)) equals the ex-ante value of being an entrepreneur (the right-hand side
of (42)). Or equivalently, using equations (5) and (33)
s°0(s) ¡ °(s) = vc0(v) ¡ c(v) (43)
The following proposition characterizes the private outcome.
Proposition 15 In the private outcome, search s is determined by (6), vacancy
















22In line with the traditional assumptions in the optimal tax literature, the government is
Stackelberg leader in the game with the private sector. Hence, tax policy is set ¯rst. If tax
policy is determined by voting, voting thus occurs before the private sector implements its
economic decisions.
24The wage w (pro¯t ¼) is the ex post pay o® or quasi rent on the sup-















) determines to which extent this quasi rent is sustained as
an ex ante surplus or rent by subtracting the costs associated with the speci¯c
investments in search activity.
The endogenous choice to become a worker or an entrepreneur can be viewed
as a decision to acquire a particular ability, namely to either search for jobs or
search for workers. These abilities are rewarded in equilibrium because both
entrepreneurs and workers collect a positive surplus on account of the convex
character of search costs. Indeed, these abilities can be viewed as the production
factors that give rise to increasing marginal search costs. The following notation
formalizes the role of these production factors.
Let f denote an agent's (exogenous) ability to look for agents at the other
side of the market. Then the production function of search intensity at the
demand (supply) side of the labour market is written as g(c;f) (h(°;f)), which
is assumed to be homogenous of degree one. The substitution elasticity between































and the elasticity of vacancies with respect to f (or the production share of



























































25Whereas section 3 assumes that the distribution of abilities over both sides
of the market is exogenously given, this section endogenously determines this
distribution. Hence, whereas the model of section 3 involved two ¯xed factors
(namely the abilities of the ¯xed number of agents at both sides of the market),
the model of this section involves only a single ¯xed factor, namely the aggregate
supply of abilities in the economy. The overall supply of abilities continues to
be determined exogenously by the number of agents in the economy because
each agent inelastically acquires her ability to search.
The quasi rents ¼ (w) can be sustained as rents if the production share of
ability f, which we will call the rent share, ®vf (®sf) is high. The results in





A large part of the population is attracted by the side of the market with
the largest rents. These rents are determined by two factors: ¯rst, the quasi
rents (¼ and w) and the rent shares (®vf and ®sf); which represent the shares
of the quasi rents that are sustained as rents. General equilibrium is established
as a lower probability of ¯nding a match o®sets the higher quasi rents. Hence,
at the side of the market with relatively small quasi rents a larger part of the
ex-ante return is paid out in the form of a high probability of ¯nding a match.
At the other side of the market, in contrast, the return accrues mainly through
a high return conditional on ¯nding a match.
4.1.2 command equilibrium















where we have used (41) to eliminate µ:





Expression (47) shows that the e±cient split between entrepreneurs and
workers ¸ depends on two determinants. The ¯rst determinant is the relative
e®ectiveness of the demand and supply sides in generating matches. In particu-
lar, if the demand side is more important in generating matches than the supply
side (´ is large), a larger part of the population should become entrepreneur
rather than worker. The second determinant of the optimal population split
is the ratio of rent shares ®vf=®sf. If vacancy costs are linear (®vf = 0), for
example, ability is not productive at the demand side of the market. Hence,
all agents should go to the supply side where they help to reduce the costs
of supplying labour (as long as ®sf > 0). If it is more costly to raise search
intensity (per person) at the demand side than at the supply side (i.e. c0(v)
and ®vf are large compared to °0(s) and ®sf); in contrast, most of the scarce
abilities should go to the demand side. Indeed, a large rent share ®vf indicates
26that it is di±cult to substitute a higher search intensity per entrepreneur for
the number of entrepreneurs in boosting labour demand. Entrepreneurs thus
provide an especially important service in raising the e±ciency of the matching
process. As a direct consequence, a large part of the population should become
entrepreneur.
4.2 optimal taxes with positive government spending





[¿ww + ¿¼¼] =
sm(µ)
1 + ¸
[y ¡ w ¡ ¼] (48)
Lemma 18 Welfare can be written as
W = s°0(s) ¡ °(s) + g (49)
As in the standard model discussed in section 2, we ¯nd that for given
government expenditure g the social planner chooses his instruments so as to
maximize search intensity at the supply side of the market. Arbitrage (43)
ensures that, in contrast to the model described in section 3, there is no trade
o® between maximizing the pay o® from search at the supply and demand sides.
Indeed, the interests of workers and entrepreneurs coincide. Accordingly, the
population agrees on optimal tax policy and distributional considerations are
not relevant in setting optimal policy.
Theorem 19 A social planner choosing a tax system that maximizes W while











The marginal cost of public funds equals
¹ =
1
1 ¡ [( ¸
1+¸)"v^ ¿¼ + ( 1
1+¸)"s^ ¿w)]
(51)
An increase in the government revenue requirement while maintaining an opti-




























We interpret in turn the optimal tax structure (50), the marginal cost of
public funds (51), and the comparative statics for tightness (52).
274.2.1 Optimal tax structure
In order to interpret the optimal tax rates, we use the following result, which
follows immediately from the theorem by multiplying (50) by w




















where ¹ g ´ g(1 + ¸)=sm(µ) = ^ ¿ww + ^ ¿p¼: Expression (54) shows that the ratio
of overall tax revenue (i.e. the sum of explicit and implicit revenues) collected
from the demand side and overall tax revenue collected from the supply side
(i.e. the right-hand side of (54)) should equal the ratio of the number of agents
at the demand side to the number of agents at the supply side (i.e. the left-hand
side of (54)). Hence, tax revenues collected from each side of the market are
proportional to the number of agents active at those sides. Tax revenue collected
per person is thus the same. By taxing both sides of the market equally, the tax
system does not distort the entrepreneurial-worker choice. Put di®erently, with
arbitrage ensuring that all agents in general equilibrium share equally in the
tax burden, it is most e±cient to tax the agents directly by collecting most tax
revenue from the side of the market with the larger number of agents rather than
indirectly through tax shifting and the associated behavioural, distortionary
e®ects on the decision to become a worker or an entrepreneur.
With a zero government ¯nancing requirement, the optimal overall tax rates
are zero (^ ¿¼ = ^ ¿w = 0 so that ¼ = ´y and w = (1¡´)y). Substituting this result
into (45), we ¯nd that the private split ¸ coincides with the socially optimal split
in (47), ¸ =
´®v
(1¡´)®s. Accordingly, the laissez fair outcome (¿¼ = 0 and ¿w = 0)
coincides with the social optimum if the Hosios condition is satis¯ed (which
implies that ^ ¿¼ = ¿¼ and ^ ¿w = ¿w). Intuitively, the only missing market in the
model is that for search activity. The investments in abilities are not speci¯c
to the match and thus are priced appropriately if the Hosios condition is met.
This result is reminiscent of a result in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) where
the Hosios condition ensures both optimal search intensities by both sides of the
market and an optimal reservation productivity at which to dissolve a match.
If Hosios is not satis¯ed, the missing market for search distorts not only
search intensity (i.e. the intensive margin) but also the split between workers
and entrepreneurs (i.e. the extensive margin). Just as in the previous sections,
the government can employ tax policy to ensure that the private outcome is
e±cient. Ex ante, all agents agree on the tax policy implied by (18) and (19),
which yields a balanced budget.
Just as in the previous sections, we can express the optimal tax system with
positive government spending in terms of a linear wage tax by employing (3)
and (4) to eliminate w and ¼ from the second equality in (50).
28Corollary 21
®vf^ ¿ = ^ ¿a (®sf ¡ ®vf) (57)
The result from section 2 (in which there are no rents at the demand side,
because ®vf = 0 so that ^ ¿a = 0 ) that only the ad valorum tax is employed to
¯nance government spending is reversed if the rent shares ®vf and ®sf coincide.
In that case, only the speci¯c tax component is used for ¯nancing spending (i.e.
^ ¿ = 0).
The optimal tax structure thus has a similar form as in section 3 (compare
(50) with (38) and (57) with (40)). However, whereas without endogenous
worker-entrepreneur choice (section 3), the second derivatives of the search costs
(°00(s) and c00(v) which are implicit in the elasticities "s and "v) are relevant,
only the ¯rst derivatives of these costs (°0(s) and c0(v) which are implicit in the
shares ®sf and ®vf) determine the optimal tax structure with an endogenous
worker{entrepreneur choice. Intuitively, with arbitrage between the two sides
of the market, the tax structure cannot separately a®ect the rewards to search
intensity at both sides of the market. The search intensities at both sides of the
market s and v are a®ected only by the overall tax burden. The tax structure
thus does not impact labour-market tightness through its e®ect on the relative
search intensity s=v: As a direct consequence, the tax structure a®ects labour-
market tightness only through the worker-entrepreneur choice, which is a®ected
by the rent shares rather than the elasticities.
4.2.2 marginal cost of public funds
The elasticities "s and "v determine the distortionary impact of the overall tax
burden on search at both sides of the market. In case the search cost functions
at both sides of the markets are identical (i.e. ®sf = ®vf and " ´ "s = "v); the
marginal costs of public funds can be written as
¹ =
1
(1 ¡ "¹ ¿)
(58)
where ¹ ¿ ´ ¿ww+¿¼¼
w+¼ . This expression coincides with the corresponding expres-
sion (39) for the case without an endogenous worker-entrepreneur choice.23
In order to further increase our intuition for expression (58), we consider the
symmetric case where ¾ ´ ¾°f = ¾cf and ®f ´ ®sf = ®vf. Substituting the






Just as in section 3, the marginal costs of public funds thus rises with both the
average tax burden ¹ ¿ and the substitution elasticity in search ¾ while it falls
with the rent share ®f.
In a model with asymmetric demand and supply, however, raising govern-
ment spending tends to be more costly in the model of section 4 in which revenue
raising can distort the worker-entrepreneur decision. To illustrate, in contrast to
23The reason is that in a symmetric model arbitrage does not add anything because the
split between workers and entrepreneurs is constant (see below).
29the model of section 3, a unitary rent share at only one side of the market (either
®sf = 1 so that "s = 0 or ®vf = 1 so that "v = 0) is not su±cient for a unitary
marginal cost of public funds. Intuitively, the aggregate supply of talents in the
economy is ¯xed rather than the supply of talents at each side of the market.
Without an endogenous worker-entrepreneur choice, a tax on the side of the
market with a unitary rent share is a lump-sum tax (since abilities at this side
are ¯xed). With an endogenous worker-entrepreneur choice, in contrast, this tax
is no longer a lump-sum tax because it distorts the worker-entrepreneur choice
(as long as the rent share at the other side of the market is positive so that
abilities are also allocated to that side of the market). Indeed, the government
is less able to exploit the inelastic side of the market (the side of the market
with a large rent share) in a model with endogenous worker-entrepreneur choice
than without such a choice.
4.2.3 labour-market tightness
To obtain more intuition for the comparative static results of more public spend-
ing on labour-market tightness (52) and (53), we consider two special cases.
Cobb Douglas production function In case of a Cobb Douglas production
function for search intensities (i.e. ¾°f = ¾cf = 1); the rent shares ®sf and ®vf
are constant. Then it follows immediately from (52) that in this case the impact
of a higher revenue requirement on labour-market tightness is proportional to
the term g(®vf ¡ ®sf). Increasing a positive initial revenue requirement thus
strengthens the side of the market on which the highest overall tax rate is levied.
The intuition is that the government protects its tax base; the government
distorts labour-market tightness for the purpose of raising revenues.
To illustrate, if most rents are at the supply side (®sf > ®vf); the govern-
ment relies mainly on wage taxation. As a direct consequence, the government
has a direct interest in raising wage income compared to pro¯t income in order
to strengthen the tax base. In order to induce the bargaining partners to in-
crease wage income at the expense of pro¯t income, the government increases
the pro¯t tax. This discourages agents from becoming entrepreneurs, thereby
raising labour supply compared to labour demand and making the labour mar-
ket less tight.
In case of a Cobb Douglas production function, we can substitute the ex-
pressions for "s and "v in Lemma 16 with ¾°f = ¾cf = 1 into the optimal tax








Comparing this expression with the optimal rule with arbitrage (50), we
observe that di®erences in rent shares have a larger impact on the optimal tax
structure in the case without arbitrage. The reason is that without arbitrage,
tax policy can exploit the ¯xed supply of abilities at each side of the market;
agents cannot escape the heavy tax burden by moving to the other side of
the labour market. With arbitrage, in contrast, taxing the inelastic side of
the market relatively heavily induces agents to move to the other side of the
market. To illustrate, if the rent share at the supply side ®sf approaches unity,
30the government ¯nds it optimal to only rely on wage taxation in a model without
arbitrage (see (59) with ®sf = 1): With arbitrage, in contrast, the wage tax is
no longer non distortionary because it a®ects the distribution of the population
between the supply and demand sides of the labour market. Hence, the optimal
tax structure trades o® the distortions from the wage tax against the distortions
from the pro¯t tax.
Symmetric case The second special case we consider is the symmetric case.
If both sides of the market feature the same cost function, a change in the
overall tax burden leaves the worker-entrepreneur-split and labour-market tight-
ness una®ected. A case that yields similar results is the case in which a large
substitution elasticity ¾:f compensates for a large rent share ®:f such that
¾°f(1 ¡ ®sf) = ¾cf(1 ¡ ®vf) so that "s®sf = "v®vf: It follows from (52) and
(53) that under these conditions, a larger tax burden does not impact labour-
market tightness 24 nor the worker-entrepreneur choice (and thus neither the
relative search intensities v=s). With the worker-entrepreneurship split not be-
ing a®ected, the model in section 3 (in which the split is exogenously ¯xed)
coincides with the model in section 4 (in which the ¯xed split is an endogenous
outcome).25 Indeed, in this case, the expressions for the optimal tax structure
((38) and (50)) and the marginal costs of public funds ((39) and (51)) coincide
in both models.
In this case the share of government spending ¯nanced through wage tax-
ation,
®sfw
®sfw+®vf¼; remains constant as the overall tax burden increases. Intu-
itively, the tax base does not erode as a consequence of a higher tax burden
because a higher tax burden expands the before-tax rent share (with a sub-
stitution elasticity larger than unity, a lower activity level increases the rent
share). Hence, the government does not have to distort labour-market tightness
to protect the tax base.
5 Conclusions
Table 1 summarizes the results of this paper in case of a Cobb-Douglas formu-
lation of search intensities. In a model with linear vacancy costs, all ex-ante
rents accrue to the supply side of the labour market. Hence, after correcting
for the Hosios condition, the government optimally taxes only the supply side
to ¯nance her expenditure. Furthermore, since it cannot redistribute rents be-
tween the two sides of the market, the optimal tax system does not distort
labour-market tightness.
These results are not robust to the introduction of convex vacancy costs.
If both the number of workers and the number of entrepreneurs are ¯xed, the
optimal tax structure features a Ramsey rule: taxes on labour demand should be
high compared to taxes on labour supply if labour demand is inelastic relative
to labour supply. If labour demand and labour supply elasticities di®er, the
24Under the restriction ":®:f = 1; the elasticity ": is not constant. This violates the assump-
tion we used in section 3 to determine the impact of a higher tax burden on labour-market
tightness.
25Whereas the restriction ":®:f = 1 and/or symmetry ensure that the model in section 4
boils down to that in section 3, the case with zero rents at the demand side (i.e. ®vf = 0)
implies that the model in section 4 coincides with that in section 2.
31optimal tax system distorts labour-market tightness in order to protect the tax
base by redistributing rents to the inelastic side of the market.
If agents can arbitrage between the demand and supply sides of the labour-
market, the government optimally sets taxes proportional to rent shares. Taxes
on labour demand should be high compared to taxes on labour supply if an
agent's ¯xed ability is relatively more important in generating search intensity
at the demand side than at the supply side of the market. Compared to the
case with a ¯xed worker-entrepreneur split, optimal tax rates are less sensitive to
di®erences in rent shares because agents can escape taxes not only by reducing
their search intensity but also by migrating to the other side of the market. As
a direct consequence, behaviour (and hence labour-market tightness) is more
elastic with respect to di®erential tax rates on both sides of the market. To
illustrate, if search intensity at the supply side is completely inelastic, the gov-
ernment collects all tax revenue from the supply side if agents cannot arbitrage.
If arbitrage is feasible, however, it taxes also the demand side in order to prevent
too many workers from becoming entrepreneurs.
With long-term arbitrage, the optimal tax system may want to distort
labour-market tightness to protect the tax base and thus redistribute resources
from the private to the public sector but not for the purpose of redistribut-
ing resources within the private sector. Indeed, just as in the case in which
one side of the market is perfectly elastic (as in section 2), redistribution is
impossible if agents can arbitrage between both sides of the market. Distribu-
tion considerations play a role only if search cost functions at both sides of the
market are convex and if agents cannot arbitrage between being a worker and
being an entrepreneur. If these conditions are met, labour-market tightness is
distorted even without a positive government ¯nancing requirement. In partic-
ular, the labour market is monopolized if the government favors workers and
monopsonized if entrepreneurs are favored.
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7 Proof of the results
Proof of lemma 2












To derive the ¯rst equation, we have substituted the government budget con-
straint sm(µ)y = sm(µ)[w + ¼] + g to eliminate the after-tax wage w from (5)




























Consider the case with g = 0. Then dµ
d¼ > 0 or equivalently (since ¼ = (1¡¯)y)
34dµ




















¸ 0 if ¼ ￿ ´y
< 0 if ¼ > ´y (63)
Hence s is maximized if ¼ = ´y or equivalently (since ¼ = (1 ¡ ¯)y) ¯ = 1 ¡ ´.
Since °0(s)s ¡ °(s) is increasing in s, ¯ = 1 ¡ ´ maximizes also s°0(s) ¡ °(s).
The following equalities show that ¯ = 1 ¡ ´ maximizes in addition welfare W
and workers' ex ante welfare sm(µ)w ¡ °(s).
W = sm(µ)y ¡ °(s) ¡ cµs = sm(µ)[w + ¼] ¡ °(s) ¡ cµs
= sm(µ)w ¡ °(s)
= s°0(s) ¡ °(s)
The second equality follows from the fact that (with g = 0) output is distributed
between workers and ¯rms (i.e. y = w + ¼); the third equality from (61) and
the last equality from (5).QED
Proof of lemma 3
The optimal values for ¿ and ¿a follow from a simple comparison of the
private outcome (i.e. (6) and (7)) and the social optimum (i.e. (8) and (9)).
Substituting (3) into (2) and using the expressions for the optimal tax rates (11)
and (12) to eliminate the tax rates from the resulting equation, we ¯nd that the
optimal tax rates yield zero public revenues. QED
Proof of lemma 5
Substituting the government budget constraint, sm(µ)y = sm(µ)[w + ¼]+g
into the expression for W in (1), we ¯nd
W = sm(µ)[w + ¼] + g ¡ °(s) ¡ cµs
= s°0(s) ¡ °(s) + g
The second equality follows from (5).QED
Proof of proposition 6
Using (5) to eliminate the after-tax wage w from (20), we ¯nd
W = s°0(s) ¡ °(s) + g (64)
Since g is exogenously given and s°0(s) ¡ °(s) is rising in s, maximizing
welfare is equivalent to maximizing search s. Thus equation (63) implies that
¼ = ´y or equivalently ^ ¿¼ = 0. The government budget constraint, ¹ g = ^ ¿ww +
^ ¿¼¼ then implies
^ ¿ww = ¹ g
QED
Proof of lemma 8
35The private outcome is determined (5) and (7) where w and ¼ are determined
by ¿w and ¿¼ as in (14) and (15). We will determine the optimal incidence w
and ¼ directly. The corresponding tax rates then follow from (14) and (15).










Then the ¯rst order condition for maximizing welfare (using Lemma 5)
s°0(s) ¡ °(s) + g + ¹[sm(µ)(y ¡ w ¡ ¼) ¡ g]
























w, this yields equation (31).
The expressions for gm; ¹ gm and ¹ ¿m can be found in three equivalent ways:
(i) Solve
max
w;¼ sm(µ)(y ¡ w ¡ ¼) = sm(µ)¹ g
subject to (60) and (61)
where ¹ g ´ g=sm(µ): Again we determine the optimal incidence ¼ and w rather
than optimizing with respect to ¿¼ and ¿w.







¡c(1 ¡ ´) + m0(µ)(y ¡ ¼ ¡ ¹ g)




























+ s = 0





;(5), and w = y¡¼¡¹ g)
(1 + "s)¹ g = y ¡ ¼ (65)












Using the comparative static results and (65), we obtain
m(µ)[¡c(1 ¡ ´) + m0 (µ)"s¹ g] + m0 (µ)s°00(s) = 0
Using cµ












¼ = y ¡ (1 + "s)¹ g = ´y (66)
Consequently,
w = y ¡ ¼ ¡ ¹ gm




= (1 ¡ ´)y
"s
1 + "s










(ii) ¹ ¿m = 1





(iii) Consider the determinant corresponding to the matrix in (62), that is
cµ






. Then we ¯nd that this determinant equals zero (and








which, using (60) and ¹ g =
g
sm(µ), can be written as
m(µ)(y ¡ ¼ ¡ ¹ g)
1
"s
¡ m(µ)¹ g = 0






Proof of lemma 10
Output accrues to workers, entrepreneurs and the government
sm(µ)y = sm(µ)(w + ¼) + g (67)
We can thus write welfare (34) as
sm(µ)[w + ¼] + g ¡ °(s) ¡ c(v)
or equivalently
[sm(µ)w ¡ °(s)] + [sm(µ)¼ ¡ c(v)] + g
With distributional considerations (parametrized by ®), we obtain
W® = ®[sm(µ)w ¡ °(s)] + [sm(µ)¼ ¡ c(v)] + g
= ®[s°0(s) ¡ °(s)] + [vc0(v) ¡ c(v)] + g
The second equality follows from the ¯rst-order conditions for search intensities
at both sides of the market (i.e. (6) and (33)).QED
Proof of theorem 11
We loglinearize the following two equations characterizing the decentralized












The ¯rst equation is found by eliminating w from (5) by using (67). The second
equation follows from (33)













"v + 1 ¡ ´
´
´(y ¡ ¼)
(1 ¡ ´)¼ w





where ¹ g ´
g









+ ´(y ¡ ¼) ¡ ¹ g
¸




















"s + w ¡ (1 ¡ ´)y
¢
38Maximizing welfare
®[s°0(s) ¡ °(s)] + vc0(v) ¡ c(v) + g








Substituting the comparative static results and using the de¯nitions of "s and
"v and (5) and (33), we can rewrite this ¯rst-order condition as
®
"s













"v ¡ 1 =
"s
®





Using the de¯nitions of the overall tax rates ^ ¿¼ ´
´y¡¼
¼ and ^ ¿w ´
(1¡´)y¡w
w ; we
can write this equation as
¡®"v^ ¿¼ + "s^ ¿w = 1 ¡ ®
With the government budget constraint
^ ¿¼¼ + ^ ¿ww = ¹ g















The solution yields the expressions for ³ and » in the theorem.
In order to determine ¹, we loglinearize the ¯rst-order conditions for s and


















"v + 1 ¡ ´ ´










s > 0; ~ x = dx
x for x = s;v;w;¼. It follows
that
¢¤~ s = ("¡1
v + 1 ¡ ´)~ w + ´~ ¼ (70)
39¢¤~ v = (1 ¡ ´)~ w + ("¡1
s + ´)~ ¼ (71)
so that
¢¤~ µ = ¢¤(~ v ¡ ~ s) = ¡"¡1
v ~ w + "¡1
s ~ ¼ (72)
The marginal cost of public funds ¹ is the Lagrange multiplier of the gov-
ernment budget constraint in the following optimization program
max
w;¼ ®[s°0(s) ¡ °(s)] + [vc0(v) ¡ c(v)] + g + ¹[sm(µ)(y ¡ w ¡ ¼) ¡ g]























We substitute the comparative static results (70), (71), and (72), multiply the
resulting equation by (¢¤w)=(sm(µ)) and use the de¯nition of ¢¤. Furthermore,





































This can also be written as
®w














6 6 6 6 6 6
4
1 ¡




















7 7 7 7 7 7
5
(73)
To arrive at the expression for ¹ in the theorem, we rewrite the expression
labelled (¤). To do so, we employ the expression for ^ ¿ww = (1 ¡ ´)y ¡ w
derived in the ¯rst part of the theorem:






































40Substitution in expression (¤) yields
(¤) =
(1 ¡ ´)¹ g + 1
"v ((1 ¡ ´)y ¡ w)
w







(1 ¡ ´)¹ g + 1
"v
w"v













































































Substituting this expression for (¤) back into (73), we arrive at
®w





































which yields the expression for ¹ in the theorem.
QED
Proof of Corollary 12









This immediately yields the Ramsey rule ^ ¿w
^ ¿¼ = "v
"s.
The expression for ¹ follows immediately from substituting ® = 1 in the














where the second equality follows from the Ramsey rule. Substituting the gov-
ernment budget constraint, ¹ g = ^ ¿ww + ^ ¿¼¼; we ¯nd that ^ ¿w = 1
"s (and thus
from the Ramsey rule that ^ ¿¼ = 1
"v). Substituting these expressions for the
overall tax rates back in the government budget constraint and using (from the






1 + ^ ¿w
(1 ¡ ´) +
^ ¿¼









Proof of lemma 14
Log-linearizing the Ramsey equation [(38) in the form of
´y¡¼
¼ "v = "s
(1¡´)y¡w
w ]









where ~ x = dx
x for x = w;¼. Using (74) to eliminate ~ ¼ from (72), we establish









































The second equality follows by eliminating ¼ and w from ¼ = ´y=(1 + ^ ¿¼) and
w = (1 ¡ ´)=(1 + ^ ¿w): By employing the expression for ^ ¿w in terms of ¹ g from
Corollary 12, we arrive at the last equality.
Since dw











^ ¿w ¡ 1
´´
. QED
Proof of proposition 15
The proof follows from the following equivalences
































The last step follows from the ¯rst order conditions for s and v (i.e. (5) and


















and the result follows since ¸ = s
vµ by the de¯nition of labour-market tightness
(41).QED
Proof of lemma 16
We ¯rst write the share parameter ®vf in terms of the function describing
search costs c(v): Since the function g(:;:) is homogenous of degree 1, we can
write

































































= 1 ¡ ®vf




























We now derive an expression for the labour-demand elasticity "v in terms
of the substitution elasticity ¾cf and the share parameter ®vf: Ignoring f tem-
porarily for notational convenience, we note that ~ g (c) is the inverse of the
function c(v). Hence we ¯nd
dv
dc
= ~ g0 (c) = (c0(v))
¡1
d2v




































































































Thus we ¯nd "v =
1¡®vf
®vf ¾cf.QED
Proof of lemma 17
The ¯rst order conditions for ¸;s and v for the maximization problem (46)
















m(µ)y(1 ¡ ´) ¡ °0(s) = 0
m0(µ)y ¡ c0(v) = 0
Substituting the last two equations to eliminate m(µ) and m0(µ), employing











Proof of lemma 18




























[s°0(s) ¡ °(s) + ¸(vc0(v) ¡ c(v))] + g
= s°0(s) ¡ °(s) + g
44The second equality follows from the fact that total output is distributed be-
tween workers, entrepreneurs and the government: s
1+¸m(µ)y = s
1+¸m(µ)[w + ¼]+
g; the third equality from the ¯rst-order conditions for search intensities at both
sides of the market (see (5) and (33)); the fourth equality from the de¯nition
(41) of labour-market tightness µ ´ v
s¸; and the last equality from arbitrage
(43).QED
Proof of theorem 19
We write the equilibrium in terms of the tax parameters ¿w and ¿¼. Search at





































where ~ ¿w ´ d¿w=(1 + ¿w) and ~ ¿¼ ´ d¿¼=(1 + ¿¼): The determinant of the











Using Cramer's rule, we ¯nd
~ s = ¡
~ ¿w(1 ¡ ´) + ~ ¿¼´
"v®vf¢
or equivalently,
~ s = ¡"s®sf
￿
(1 ¡ ´)~ ¿w + ´~ ¿¼
(1 ¡ ´)®sf + ´®vf
¸
(78)
Similarly, using Cramer's rule, we ¯nd
~ v = ¡"v®vf
￿
(1 ¡ ´)~ ¿w + ´~ ¿¼




®vf~ ¿w ¡ ®sf~ ¿¼
(1 ¡ ´)®sf + ´®vf
(80)
The social planner chooses ¿w and ¿¼ to maximize welfare (49) subject to
the government budget constraint (48):
max
¿w;¿¼











)(1 ¡ ¯)y] ¡ g
¸
45where ¹ represents the marginal costs of public funds. Here we have used
the de¯nition of tightness (41) to eliminate ¸ and (14) and (15) to eliminate,
respectively, w and ¼.
The ¯rst-order condition for optimizing welfare W with respect to the pro-
portional wage tax ¿w amounts to (where we have used (14) to eliminate
(1 + ¿w))
sWs(~ s=~ ¿w) + vWv(~ v=~ ¿w) + µWµ(~ µ=~ ¿w) + ¹sm(µ)(1 + ¸)¡1w = 0 (81)
where Ws and Wv denote the ¯rst-order welfare e®ects of changes in search




























Substitution of (78)-(80) and (82)-(84) into (81) yields (where we have used (45)
to eliminate ¸)




w®s + ¼®v ¡ ¹ g
h
( ¸

















We can write the ¯rst-order condition for optimizing welfare W with respect to
the wage tax ¿¼ in the same way. This yields




w®s + ¼®v ¡ ¹ g
h
( ¸

















Using (85) and (86) to eliminate ¹; we ¯nd that the last term at the right-hand
sides of (85) and (86) should be zero. Using ¹ g = ^ ¿ww+^ ¿¼¼; w = (1 ¡ ´)y¡^ ¿ww













By using (45) to eliminate ¸ from (87), we ¯nd the Ramsey rule (50). Sub-
stituting (87) into (85) (or (86)), we arrive at (51).
To ¯nd dµ
dg we log-linearize the following ¯rst order conditions for s and v
°0(s) = m(µ)
￿












46These two equations are derived from (5) and (33) where we have used w =
(1¡´)y ¡ ^ ¿ww = (1¡´)y ¡
g
sm(µ) to eliminate w from (5) and ¼ = ´y ¡ ^ ¿¼¼ =
´y¡
gµ
vm(µ) (because ^ ¿¼¼ = ¸^ ¿ww = ¸
g
sm(µ) from (48) and (54)). Loglinearization






































The determinant of the matrix on the left hand side can be written as
































































®vf(1 + ^ ¿w)
®sf(1 + ^ ¿¼)
(88)
where we have used that ^ ¿ww = (1 ¡ ´)y ¡ w and hence w =
(1¡´)y
1+^ ¿w . Similarly
¼ =
´y
1+^ ¿¼ . Using this expression to eliminate ®vf=®sf from the expression for
the optimal tax structure (50), we ¯nd
^ ¿w
1 + ^ ¿w







Log-linearizing this equation and using the (55) and (56) to eliminate ^ ¿w
and ^ ¿¼; we arrive at




where ~ ¿i ´ d¿i=(1 + ¿i) = d^ ¿i=(1 + ^ ¿i) i = 1;2: Substitution of this expression












¸ exogenous ¸ endogenous
®vf = 0 ^ ¿¼
^ ¿w = 0 same as
case dµ
dg = 0 ¸ exogenous case
®vf > 0 ^ ¿¼




























= sign(g(®vf ¡ ®sf))
Table 1: summary of optimal taxes
for the Cobb Douglas formulation of search intensities (¾°f = ¾cf = 1)
48